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Amputating Rights-Making
ANTHONY MICHAEL KREIS*
In a majority of states, it remains legal to deny people housing, employment, or
services because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. The LGBT community
has taken great strides to push back against the harms of discrimination,
successfully securing municipal antidiscrimination laws in a number of discrete
(and typically liberal) cities. While an individual’s right to enjoy full, equal
citizenship should not depend on their zip code, hard-wrought municipal protections
are a crucial step toward achieving more robust civil rights protections.
Hostile state legislators in Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee crafted laws to
prohibit localities from protecting classes of people beyond state law with the aim to
block LGBT civil rights ordinances. Legislators in a handful of other states have
offered similar bills. How should courts treat neutral laws adopted by states that
amputate municipal civil rights-making powers? This Article argues that courts
should use political restructuring doctrine, evolving LGBT rights jurisprudence, and
the landmark decision Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation, to void municipal civil rights preemption laws as constitutionally
deficient.

* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Ph.D., University of Georgia
School of Public and International Affairs, J.D., Washington and Lee, B.A., University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. This piece evolved from lectures at the University of Notre Dame School of Law and the
University of Illinois College of Law, where I received thoughtful feedback for which I am grateful. I also
benefited tremendously from exchanges with Joshua Block, Jim Oleske, Eric Seagall, and Robin Fretwell
Wilson.
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INTRODUCTION
After twenty-five years of failed attempts to outlaw sexual
orientation and gender identity discrimination in Charlotte, North
Carolina, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) rights
advocates at long last prevailed upon the Charlotte City Council to act.1
On February 22, 2016, the City Council passed Ordinance 7056 banning
discrimination against LGBT persons by operators of public
accommodation, common carriers, and city contractors.2 The ordinance
would take effect on April 1, 2016.3 Unfriendly intervention by state
legislators, however, snuffed out Charlotte’s civil rights expansion.
State legislative leaders announced a special session of the North
Carolina General Assembly to block Charlotte’s ordinance before it
became effective.4 On March 23, 2016, lawmakers introduced House
Bill 2. Named the Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, House Bill 2
(“H.B. 2”) sailed through both chambers and was approved by Governor
Pat McCrory in less than twelve hours.5
Despite the bill’s innocuous title, the sweeping legislation crushed
local regulatory powers across the board and disparately targeted the
LGBT community. The bill curtailed private rights of action under the
state’s employment discrimination statute.6 The legislation forbade
local governments from raising the minimum wage or expanding labor

1. Steve Harrison, Charlotte Is Again Weighing LGBT Protections, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb.
2, 2016, 6:13 PM), (noting the first failed attempt to amend the Charlotte nondiscrimination
ordinance in 1990).
2. Steve Harrison, Charlotte City Council Approves LGBT Protections in 7–4 Vote, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Feb. 22, 2016, 3:06 PM).
3. Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 (2016).
4. Jim Morrill, NC Lawmakers Heading for Special Session Wednesday to Discuss LGBT
Ordinance, NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 21, 2016, 7:15 PM).
5. Camila Domonoske, North Carolina Passes Law Blocking Measures to Protect LGBT
People, NPR (Mar. 24, 2016, 11:29 AM).
6. H.B. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (N.C. 2016).

KREIS-69.1.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2017]

12/22/17 12:41 AM

AMPUTATING RIGHTS-MAKING

97

rights.7 Legislators rejected the right of transgender persons to use
facilities consistent with their gender identity.8 To that end, H.B. 2
mandated transgender individuals use public restrooms and changing
facilities consistent with the sex listed on their birth certificates.9
While H.B. 2 enacted North Carolina’s first statewide public
accommodation antidiscrimination law, it simultaneously nullified local
public accommodations and employment nondiscrimination ordinances
inconsistent with state law.10 Because North Carolina civil rights law did
not extend protected class status to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender persons in employment and public accommodations, cities
were now barred from expressly doing so. After intense public backlash,
the North Carolina General Assembly repealed most of H.B. 2, but left
the preemption component in place with a four-year sunset provision.11
North Carolina was not the first state to pull back local government
power to promulgate civil rights protections. Tennessee and Arkansas
passed similar legislation in 2011 and 2015, respectively.12 The Tar Heel
State may not be the last to clamp down on local control and stave off
local LGBT-inclusive nondiscrimination protections, either. Legislators
in Montana, Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas, and West Virginia
have introduced legislation of this sort.13 Unless the LGBT community
gains sufficient political clout to stop state legislators in conservative
states from running roughshod over progressive municipalities, LGBT
persons will need to seek refuge in the courts to rebalance the political
process.
Notably, preemption of local government authority is a more
generalizable trend that stretches beyond LGBT civil rights as
conservative state legislators work to stymie a broad swath of
progressive policies championed in urban pockets of their states.14
Iowa, Ohio, and Oklahoma, for example, are among the states that
prohibited cities from enacting minimum wages greater than the state’s

7. Id. § 2.2.
8. Id. §§ 1.2, 1.3.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Bruce Henderson & Tim Funk, Understanding the HB2 Repeal Law—What It Does and
Doesn’t Do, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 30, 2017, 8:50 AM).
12. ARK. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 14-1-401–14-1-403 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 4-21-102
(2012).
13. H.B. 516, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2011); H.B. 5039, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011);
Leg. B. 912, 102nd Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2012); H.B. 2245, 53nd Leg., 2nd Sess. (Okla. 2012); S.B.
1289, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2016); S.B. 694, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017); S.B. 92, 85th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); H.B. 2899, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); S.B.6, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 2017).
14. See Emily Badger, Blue Cities Want to Make Their Own Rules. Red States Won’t Let Them,
N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2017), (describing the rising number of state preemption laws aimed at thwarting
liberal city policies).

KREIS-69.1.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

98

12/22/17 12:41 AM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:95

minimum wage.15 Arizona, Indiana, and Michigan are a few of the states
that recently blocked localities from regulating plastic bags.16 In 2017,
Texas became the latest state to ban so-called sanctuary cities,
penalizing municipalities that refuse to cooperate with federal
immigration enforcement.17 After St. Louis adopted an ordinance in
2017 banning employment and housing discrimination against women
for their reproductive healthcare decisions,18 Missouri’s governor called
on legislators to overturn it in a special session, warning that St. Louis
would become an “abortion sanctuary city.”19 The Missouri Legislature
did so, overturning the St. Louis ordinance via preemption legislation.20
As this Article later describes in greater detail, there is an
appreciable difference between legislation targeting local economic
regulations and legislation intended to burden a disfavored minority
group. How should courts treat facially neutral laws adopted by states
that amputate municipal civil rights-making and thwart LGBT equality?
This Article argues that taken together, political restructuring cases,
evolving LGBT rights jurisprudence, and the landmark decision in
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation21 offer a path to void municipal civil rights preemption
laws as constitutionally deficient.22
The Article proceeds in six parts. Part I reviews the form and
function of municipalities in American law. Part II examines courts’
treatment of laws restructuring municipal governments to harm racial
15. H. File 295, 87th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4111.02 (2017); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 160 (West 2014).
16. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-269.16 (2016); IND. CODE § 36-1-3-8.6 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 445.591 (2017).
17. S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017).
18. Saint Louis, Mo., Ordinance 70459 (Feb. 1, 2017).
19. Missouri Governor Calls Special Session on Abortion, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (June 7,
2017, 2:49 PM).
20. H.B. 174, 99th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017):
A political subdivision of this state is preempted from enacting, adopting, maintaining, or
enforcing any order, ordinance, rule, regulation, policy, or other similar measure that
prohibits, restricts, limits, controls, directs, interferes with, or otherwise adversely affects
an alternatives to abortion agency or its officers’, agents’, employees’, or volunteers’
operations or speech including, but not limited to, counseling, referrals, or education of,
advertising or information to, other communications with, clients, patients, other persons,
or the public.
21. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
22. While other scholars have examined this question, some have not focused on Arlington
Heights, written before recent decisions on same-sex marriage and political restructuring, or before
North Carolina’s H.B. 2. See Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, The Case for LGBT Equality:
Reviving the Political Process Doctrine and Repurposing the Dormant Commerce Clause,
81 BROOK. L. REV. 1015 (2016); John M. A. DiPippa, Bias in Disguise: The Constitutional Problems
of Arkansas’s Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 469 (2015);
Alex Reed, Pro-Business or Anti-Gay? Disguising LGBT Animus as Economic Legislation, 9 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 153 (2013).
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minorities, and Part III examines the relationship between those cases
and litigation concerning LGBT discrimination. Part IV assess critiques
that the political restructuring doctrine has lost potency in modern
jurisprudence and argues how the doctrine should be used to strike
down anti-LGBT municipal preemption laws. In Part V, the Article
examines the relationship between political process theories and
same-sex marriage cases. Finally, Part VI addresses how courts should
tackle the issue of state preemption laws’ facial neutrality.
I. LOCALITIES AS CREATURES OF THE STATE
The ability of local governments to regulate and improve the lives
of citizens is critical. Their “chief purpose” is to act in the “interest,
advantage and convenience of the locality and its people.”23 Municipal
governments reduce the cost of political participation and allow
constituencies that hold little power on the state level to wield
considerable influence over local affairs. For these reasons, local
lawmaking must not be treated cavalierly¾particularly with respect to
disfavored groups. The importance of their representative function
notwithstanding, localities remain subject to both the constraints
imposed by state legislators and the electorate, who can reign in local
governments they deem rogue.
Municipalities’ important function with respect to democratic
governance, however, is in tension with the idea that local governments
exist for the state’s convenience. “Municipal corporations owe their
origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the
legislature. It breathes into the breath of life, without which they cannot
exist.”24 This is a foundational principle of American law.25 Judge
Eugene McQuillan expounded on this concept in his seminal municipal
law treatise, noting that barring “a specific constitutional inhibition, a
state, by its legislature, may create municipal and public
corporations . . . [to] exercise delegated powers . . . as subordinate
departments, auxiliaries, or convenient instrumentalities of the state for
the purpose of local or municipal rule.”26

23. EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2:11 (3d ed. 2010).
24. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868).
25. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907):
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient
agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted
to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually
are given the power to acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number,
nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory
over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State.
26. MCQUILLIN, supra note 23, § 1:21.
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The dual concepts that municipalities are not sovereign entities yet
also constitute the lifeblood of a healthy democratic system can conflict.
Because local governments are creatures of the states, states are
generally free to enact legislation or adopt constitutional provisions to
centralize power. States possess “extraordinarily wide latitude” to
delegate authority and define the powers of local governments.27
However, states cannot erect barriers to political participation when
motivated by the desire to harm an identifiable minority group.28
The courts have a duty to exercise judicial review to protect the
fairness of the political process. When the mechanisms of government
are constructed to burden an identifiable class of persons’ ability to
participate in the democratic process, the courts have the prerogative to
clear the channels of policymaking.
II. POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING AND HUNTER-SEATTLE
In the landmark 1969 ruling Hunter v. Erickson, the Supreme
Court embraced political restructuring theory.29 In 1964, the Akron City
Council enacted a fair housing ordinance to “assure equal opportunity
to all persons to live in decent housing facilities regardless of race, color,
religion, ancestry or national origin.”30 The ordinance provided for a
city Commission on Equal Opportunity in Housing to investigate
housing discrimination and take action against persons violating the
nondiscrimination law.31 After the Ordinance’s enactment, the requisite
ten percent of voters needed to submit a question for referendum
successfully placed a question on the ballot to overturn the
anti-discrimination provision and amended Akron’s charter.32 Winning
majority approval at the ballot box, the newly-amended city charter
voided the preexisting fair housing ordinance and required popular
approval of any future housing law:
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which
regulates the use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assignment,
lease, sublease or financing of real property of any kind or of any
interest therein on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or
ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the electors voting on
the question at a regular or general election before said ordinance
shall be effective. Any such ordinance in effect at the time of the

27. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978); see also MCQUILLIN, supra note
23, § 1:21.
28. See infra Part III.
29. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
30. Id. at 386.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 387.
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adoption of this section shall cease to be effective until approved by
the electors as provided herein.33

The charter’s housing provision was challenged under the Equal
Protection Clause. Ultimately, the Court rejected justifications that the
charter amendment served a legitimate function to allow for a more
deliberative approach to tackling housing discrimination or that it
served some broad democratic interest. Indeed, the Hunter Court noted
that the Constitution cannot tolerate the diminution of political power
in the political process any more than the purposeful dilution of
minority voting rights.34 The Court reasoned in Hunter that because the
measure “disadvantage[d] those who would benefit from laws barring
racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations as against those who
would bar other discriminations or who would otherwise regulate the
real estate market in their favor,” it could not withstand constitutional
scrutiny.35
In 1971, the Court declined to extend Hunter to a California
constitutional amendment that required municipalities to put up all
projects for low-rent housing for referendum.36 The Court determined
that because the California Constitution burdened “any low-rent public
housing project, not only for projects which will be occupied by a racial
minority” there was insufficient evidence of intentional discrimination
to invalidate the referendum requirement.37 In that vein, the majority
pointed out that the added procedural requirement “ensures that all the
people of a community will have a voice in a decision which may lead to
large expenditures of local governmental funds for increased public
services and to lower tax revenues.”38
Twice, the Court affirmed rulings against restructuring laws that
blocked officials from pursuing policies to remedy discriminatory
practices in public education. In 1969, New York enacted a statute
prohibiting state education officials and appointed school boards from
promulgating any policy aimed to achieve racial equality and balance in
school districts.39 The legislation responded to efforts by the New York

33. Id.
34. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Hunter v. Erickson, 391 U.S. 963 (1968) (No. 63), 1968 WL
112644, at *14; Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392:
We are unimpressed with any of Akron’s justifications for its discrimination.
Characterizing it simply as a public decision to move slowly in the delicate area of race
relations emphasizes the impact and burden of [the charter amendment] but does not
justify it. The amendment was unnecessary either to implement a decision to go slowly, or
to allow the people of Akron to participate in that decision.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 391–92.
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
Id.
Id. at 143.
Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710, 717 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d sub nom. Chropowicki v. Lee,
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Education Commissioner to combat worsening racial segregation in the
state’s public schools, a problem exacerbated by changing housing
patterns and economic shifts.
The statute’s defenders argued that the law’s intent was not to
impede desegregation efforts or wholesale blockade policies to promote
greater public school integration, but to guarantee that officials crafted
racial diversification policies at the local level attuned to local
sensitivities.40 The three-judge district court rejected the notion that the
local deference rationale was race-neutral.41 Far from the benign
justifications offered in support of the law, the statute was designed to
empower local biases. The panel held, “To the extent, however, that the
statute thus recognizes and accedes to local racial hostility, the
existence of which has created in the past a serious obstacle to the
elimination of de facto segregation, the purpose is clearly an
impermissible one.”42
In 1982, the Supreme Court struck down a Washington State law,
adopted by initiative, barring school boards from promulgating rules
that would mandate a student attend any school except the institution
geographically closest to the student’s residence.43 The state law,
Initiative 350, included a number of exceptions to the rule. Students
could be assigned to institutions other than those most proximate to
their homes when students required special education, when health or
safety hazards precluded such an assignment, when natural or
manmade obstacles stood in the way, or “the school nearest or next
nearest to his place of residence is unfit or inadequate because of
overcrowding, unsafe conditions or lack of physical facilities.”44
Initiative 350’s practical impact was that school boards retained wide
discretion in assigning students to particular schools, but walled off
options for tackling racial disparities and segregation patterns in
schools.
The district court was unmoved by arguments that the Washington
law was, in fact, race-neutral. The court found that the “adverse effects
of racially imbalanced schools fall most heavily upon minority
students,” and that Initiative 350 did not “permit a school board to
assign students for the purpose of remedying De jure segregation”

402 U.S. 935 (1971).
40. Id. (quoting Senator Norman Lent “. . . [The legislation is] absolutely necessary if this
Legislature is ever going to put a halt to situations where a duly constituted elected board familiar
with local conditions and sentiment is forced to implement a plan conceived in and mandated from
Albany which, tragically, disrupts the stability and educational climate in the community.”).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 720.
43. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 462 (1982).
44. Id.
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absent a court order.45 Nor could a local community opt to innovate
policies to encourage diverse classes and combat de facto patterns of
discrimination under Washington law.46 Because Initiative 350 worked
to undermine the reach of local powers to fight discrimination, it could
not withstand scrutiny.47
On the same day that the decision striking Initiative 350 was
handed down, the Supreme Court upheld a California Constitution
provision that restricted state courts’ ability to desegregate schools. In
1963, an action was brought in state court to desegregate the Los
Angeles Unified School District. The trial court found the school district
was de jure segregated in contravention of the California Constitution
and U.S. Constitution.48 The California Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court’s decision under the state constitution, holding the state
constitution barred de facto and de jure segregation.
After nine years of litigation, while the trial court prepared busing
plans to remedy the constitutional infirmity, voters ratified a state
constitutional amendment that allowed state courts to mandate pupil
reassignment and transportation-based remedies only when federal
constitutional law required.49 The amendment did not, however,
overturn state judges’ obligation to require that schools remedy de jure
segregation. Finding no evidence of intentional discrimination, a state
appellate court later blocked the trial court from proceeding further
with new integration plans for Los Angeles schools.
The new amendment was challenged under the Hunter doctrine.
Unlike the case out of Seattle, the California provision did not
fundamentally reorder the political structure to the disadvantage of
racial minorities. The Court concluded that the electorate’s decision to
limit the state judiciary’s remedial power while “preserving a greater
right to desegregation than exists under the Federal Constitution” could
not logically be said to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.50 A
45. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty., Wash. v. State of Wash., 473 F. Supp. 996, 1011 (W.D.
Wash. 1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State of Wash., 633 F.2d
1338 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d sub nom. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 102 S. Ct.
3187, 73 L. Ed. 2d 896 (1982).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1016.
48. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 530 (1982).
49. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7:
[N]o court of this State may impose upon the State of California or any public entity,
board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil school
assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy a specific violation by such party
that would also constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be
permitted under federal decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon
such party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .
50. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 542.
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concurring opinion authored by Justice Blackmun, and joined by
Justice Brennan, highlighted that the constitutional amendment did not
undermine fairness within the political process. Justice Blackmun
wrote:
State courts do not create the rights they enforce; those rights
originate elsewhere¾in the state legislature, in the State’s political
subdivisions, or in the state constitution itself. When one of those
rights is repealed, and therefore is rendered unenforceable in the
courts, that action hardly can be said to restructure the State’s
decisionmaking mechanism. While the California electorate may have
made it more difficult to achieve desegregation when it enacted
Proposition I, to my mind it did so not by working a structural change
in the political process so much as by simply repealing the right to
invoke a judicial busing remedy. Indeed, ruling for petitioners on a
Hunter
theory
seemingly
would
mean
that
statutory
affirmative-action or antidiscrimination programs never could be
repealed, for a repeal of the enactment would mean that enforcement
authority previously lodged in the state courts was being removed by
another political entity.51

Importantly, the types of political restructuring held
constitutionally infirm under Hunter-Seattle are those that burden
identifiable classes. This was dispositive in Gordon v. Lance, a 1971
challenge to the West Virginia Constitution and statutes governing
municipal finances.52 West Virginia law prohibited political
subdivisions from incurring bonded indebtedness or levying tax
increases beyond constitutionally proscribed limits without the
approval of sixty percent of the voters in a referendum.53 The Supreme
Court reversed the state high court’s ruling to strike the state
constitutional and statutory supermajority requirements as violative of
the Equal Protection Clause. The Court determined that Hunter was
inapplicable because, unlike the Akron charter amendment, “the West
Virginia Constitution singles out no ‘discrete and insular minority’ for
special treatment. The three-fifths requirement applies equally to all
bond issues for any purpose, whether for schools, sewers, or
highways.”54
Taken together, Hunter and its progeny stand for the proposition
that restructuring the political process to stymie policies aimed at
eradicating discrimination against vulnerable minority classes cannot
meet constitutional muster. That baseline principle was later extended
in 1996 to lesbians, gays, and bisexuals in Romer v. Evans.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 546–47.
Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1971).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
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III. SEXUAL ORIENTATION, ANIMUS, AND RESTRUCTURING
Like Hunter, Romer arose from the electorate’s resistance to the
expansion of local laws protecting against class-based discrimination, in
this instance lesbians, gays, and bisexuals (“LGB”). Before 1992, a
handful of Colorado municipalities, including the cities of Aspen,
Boulder, and Denver, enacted ordinances banning LGB discrimination
in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and
healthcare services.55 In response, Colorado voters ratified Amendment
2 to the state constitution, prohibiting localities from adopting
ordinances that expanded civil rights protections on the basis of
“homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships.”56
Amendment 2’s ambit reached well beyond voiding municipal laws
protecting against sexual orientation discrimination. Indeed, the
wholesale ban on antidiscrimination protections reached into every area
of state government¾from the legislature, to the executive branch, to
state agencies, to political subdivisions, and to school districts.57 After
Amendment 2’s ratification, a number of gay plaintiffs and three
Colorado municipalities filed suit in state court.58 The plaintiffs alleged
that Amendment 2 violated the Fourteenth Amendment and requested
injunctive relief.59 A Colorado trial court agreed and the Colorado
Supreme Court affirmed.60
Along with 1960s-era voting rights cases, the Colorado Supreme
Court grounded their analysis of Amendment 2’s constitutionality in the
Hunter-Seattle doctrine. The court determined the anti-gay
constitutional amendment “expressly fences out an independently
identifiable group” in a manner similar to the measure “invalidated in
Hunter, which singled out the class of persons” from freely using the
channels of government on an equal basis to secure civil rights
protections and curb invidious discrimination. “No other identifiable
group faces such a burden,” the court noted.61 Applying strict scrutiny,
the Colorado Supreme Court struck down Amendment 2 because it
purposefully blocked gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from “participating
equally in the political process.”62

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996).
Id. at 624.
Id. at 625.
Id.
Id.
Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1285 (Colo. 1993).
Id.
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The Supreme Court affirmed the state courts’ judgments but
abandoned strict scrutiny.63 The Court applied a more exacting rational
basis review than traditionally embraced by the Court.64 Despite the
urging of multiple parties,65 the Court also avoided the Hunter doctrine
altogether, though the opinion mirrored the Colorado Supreme Court’s
political process approach. In striking down the state constitutional
amendment on equal protection grounds, the Court’s majority
emphasized that Amendment 2 placed non-heterosexuals “by state
decree . . . in a solitary class with respect to transactions and relations in
both the private and governmental spheres” because it walled off from
LGB persons “but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries
caused by discrimination.”66
The state justified Amendment 2 arguing that it was intended to
protect business owners’ freedom of association and the rights of
religious objectors to homosexuality. Colorado also proffered that there
was an economic benefit for businesses gained by ensuring statewide
uniformity in nondiscrimination laws in addition to a benefit of
shielding localities from contentious fights over homosexuality.67 While
the Romer opinion did not address the uniformity or political
fragmentation arguments,68 the majority reasoned that the “breadth of
the amendment is so far removed from [the associational and religious
liberty] justifications” that it was “impossible to credit them.”69 Rather,
63. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (Amendment 2’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons
offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it
affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”).
64. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 760 (2011) (“In the
1996 case of Romer v. Evans, the Court invalidated an antigay state constitutional
amendment . . . depart[ing] from the usual deference associated with rational basis review. For this
reason, commentators have correctly discerned a new rational basis with bite standard in such
cases.”).
65. See Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the
Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363 (2011) (“Many of the briefs in the case addressed the
Hunter theory, but that argument was explicitly set aside by the high Court without comment.”).
66. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627.
67.
The State also benefits from creating an environment where large employers and property
owners may operate under uniform laws, thereby providing greater economic and legal
predictability in their affairs. Equally important is the necessity of ensuring that the deeply
divisive issue of homosexuality does not serve to seriously fragment Colorado’s body
politic.
Brief for Petitioner at *47, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), 1995 WL 310026, at *47.
68. The state trial court noted a discrepancy between the justifications offered by the state for
Amendment 2 and the measure’s purpose according to Amendment 2’s architects. At trial, three
major proponents of Amendment 2 stated the goal of the amendment was to “deny protected status
to homosexuals and bisexuals,” . . . “fend off state-wide militant gay aggression,” and “prevent the
government from declaring that homosexuals are entitled to protected class status.” Evans v. Romer,
No. CIV. A. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *4 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993).
69. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
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the impetus behind Amendment 2 was an illegitimate desire to harm
non-heterosexuals.
Soon after Romer, federal courts were asked to consider a
challenge to Cincinnati’s restriction on local protections for gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals in Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v.
City of Cincinnati. In 1991, the City Council enacted an ordinance
prohibiting discrimination in municipal employment on the basis of
“race, color, sex, handicap, religion, national or ethnic origin, age,
sexual orientation, HIV status, Appalachian regional ancestry, and
marital status.”70 In 1992, Cincinnati adopted an ordinance extending
civil rights protections in public accommodations, housing, and
employment to cover claims of sexual orientation discrimination.71
Gay rights opponents filed a petition for a referendum to amend
the city’s charter to invalidate the sexual orientation antidiscrimination
provisions and bar the Cincinnati City Council from enacting any other
protections for the LGB community.72 Anti-gay interests prevailed in
November 1992. Like Akron’s city charter limitations for housing policy
in 1968, any civil rights ordinance to prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination would require a popular referendum. That similarity
notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the
charter revision without a substantial treatment of the Hunter decision,
though the court’s opinion thoroughly examined Romer.
The Sixth Circuit employed Hunter to emphasize the basic
proposition that local policies adopted by popular referendum are
entitled to judicial deference because they are “designed in part to
preserve community values and character” unless those measures
“impinge upon any fundamental right or the interests of any suspect or
quasi-suspect class.”73 That was the extent of the opinion’s treatment of
Hunter and the political process theory cases.
Relying on Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld laws criminalizing
sodomy, the panel held that because “the conduct which define[]

70. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 292 (6th Cir.
1997).
71. Id. at 292.
72.
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact, adopt,
enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which provides that
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship constitutes,
entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis to have any claim of minority or
protected status, quota preference or other preferential treatment. This provision of the
City Charter shall in all respects be self-executing. Any ordinance, regulation, rule or
policy enacted before this amendment is adopted that violates the foregoing prohibition
shall be null and void and of no force or effect.
Id. at 291.
73. Id. at 297.
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homosexuals was constitutionally proscribable” and not a suspect or
quasi-suspect class, the court was bound to accord the Cincinnati
measure with highest degree of deference and applied rational basis
review.74 The court applied a weak rational basis review and
differentiated Colorado’s Amendment 2 from the Cincinnati charter.
The opinion reasoned that Amendment 2 and the Cincinnati initiative
were “substantially different enactments of entirely distinct scope and
impact.”75
Whereas Colorado’s Amendment 2 in Romer left LGB persons
“without recourse to any state authority at any level of government for
any type of victimization or abuse,” the Cincinnati Charter Amendment
“merely” forbade them from “obtaining special privileges and
preferences” in one municipal jurisdiction.76 That analysis would carry
greater persuasion had the initiative simply reversed the city’s
discretionary civil rights policy and not imposed an additional political
hurdle to overcome. In the years since Equality Foundation was handed
down, a number of lower courts in the Sixth Circuit called the decision’s
currency into question,77 noting that it came before Lawrence v. Texas’
overturning Bowers in 2003.78
Despite the panel’s flawed pre-Lawrence reasoning that failed to
apply Hunter with any rigor, the opinion was not silent on the
permissibility of laws on the state level to suffocate civil rights on the
local level. In that vein, the panel proffered that while a city’s
self-imposed limitation on sexual orientation discrimination
protections could withstand rational basis review, a statewide blanket
ban on local civil rights measures to shield LGB persons from invidious
treatment would fall under Romer even when justified on economic and
associative freedom grounds:

74. Id. at 293. The court followed similar logic employed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“It would be quite anomalous,
on its face, to declare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as
deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause.”).
75. Equal. Found., 128 F.3d at 295.
76. Id. at 296.
77. See Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 986 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (“Equality
Foundation no longer stands as sound precedential authority for the proposition that restrictions on
gay and lesbian individuals are subject to rational basis analysis.”) rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder,
772 F.3d 388, 415 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015);
Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939, 961 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (emphasizing that the Equality
Foundation reliance on Bowers makes its precedential value “worthy of reexamination”).
78. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided,
and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be
and now is overruled.”).
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A state law which prevents local voters or their representatives, against
their will, from granting special rights to gays, cannot be rationally
justified by cost savings and associational liberties which the majority
of citizens in those communities do not want. Clearly, the financial
interests and associational liberties of the citizens of the state as a whole
are not implicated if a municipality creates special legal protections for
homosexuals applicable only within that jurisdiction and implements
those protections solely via local governmental apparatuses. For this
reason, the justifications proffered by Colorado for Colorado
Amendment 2 insufficiently supported that provision, and implied that
no reason other than a bare desire to harm homosexuals, rather than to
advance the individual and collective interests of the majority of
Colorado’s citizens, motivated the state’s voters to adopt Colorado
Amendment 2.79

Though dicta, the Equality Foundation court recognized that the
economic justifications a state might offer in defense of preempting
localities from combating discrimination against sexual minorities
merely belie anti-gay animus. The court erred in upholding the
Cincinnati charter amendment because it was unable to project the
trend Romer would spark while Bowers remained good law. That
myopic application of Romer notwithstanding, the court nevertheless
still understood¾well before Lawrence¾that the courts should reject
economic and associational rationalizations for statewide policies that
amputate local bodies from the rights-making process as window
dressing.
IV. RETHINKING HUNTER’S “RETRENCHMENT”
The Hunter doctrine took center stage in a 2013 challenge to the
Michigan Constitution’s limitations on affirmative action programs. In
2003, the Supreme Court ruled in Grutter v. Bollinger that the
affirmative action policy at the University of Michigan’s law school
withstood constitutional scrutiny because it took into limited
consideration applicants’ race in a holistic fashion.80 In a companion
case, Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court struck down the University of
Michigan’s undergraduate admissions policy that rigidly assigned a
numerical value to applicants if they were from an underrepresented
racial group.81
Soon after the pair of decisions, Michigan voters adopted a state
constitutional amendment, Proposal 2, which prohibited state and local
governments as well as public institutions, like public colleges and
universities, from using any race conscious policies. The amendment
compelled the state and its subdivisions to “not discriminate against, or

79. Equal. Found., 128 F.3d at 300.
80. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003).
81. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271, 275–76 (2003).

KREIS-69.1.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

110

12/22/17 12:41 AM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:95

grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting.”82 A collection of
organized interest groups subsequently filed suit in federal court
challenging the constitutional provision, theorizing it violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it rigged the architecture of policymaking to
disadvantage racial minorities.
Rejecting the plaintiff’s equal protection claim, the district court
granted a motion for summary judgment by the Michigan Attorney
General.83 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the grant of summary
judgment.84 After granting en banc review, the Sixth Circuit again
reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that Michigan
Constitution’s constraints on affirmative action ran afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause because it constituted impermissible political
restructuring. Using the example of legacy admissions policies that
benefit the children of alumni, the court illustrated the disparate impact
of Proposal 2. The court said:
An interested Michigan citizen may use any number of avenues to
change the admissions policies on an issue outside the scope of
Proposal 2. For instance, a citizen interested in admissions policies
benefitting . . . sons and daughters of alumni of the university w may
lobby the admissions committees . . . may petition higher
administrative authorities at the university . . . may seek to affect the
election . . . of any one of the eight board members . . . [and] may
campaign for an amendment to the Michigan Constitution.85

The Supreme Court, 6-2, reversed the Sixth Circuit in a series of
opinions. The plurality opinion by Justice Kennedy defended the
Michigan amendment as a legitimate exercise of the democratic
process:
Our constitutional system embraces . . . the right of citizens to debate
so they can learn and decide and then, through the political process,
act in concert to try to shape the course of their own times and the
course of a nation that must strive always to make freedom ever
greater and more secure.86

82. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 26.
83. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 924,
957 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
84. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. By
Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 652 F.3d 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2011).
85. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. By
Any Means Necessary v. Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 701 F.3d 466, 484 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub
nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for
Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1645 (2014).
86. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for
Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 (2014).
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The lead opinion went on to explain that the political process
remained open for voters to consider what types of “programs designed
to increase diversity¾consistent with the Constitution¾[might be a]
necessary part of progress to transcend the stigma of past racism.”87
While Schutte could be understood as striking a blow to political
process theory, the jurisprudential foundation of affirmative action
cases disfavors painting the Court’s decision with such a broad brush.
When the Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of
affirmative action programs in Regents of California v. Bakke, Justice
Lewis Powell writing for a 4-1-4 fractured court, rejected claims that
affirmative action programs were constitutionally justifiable as a tool to
ameliorate past discrimination. Powell wrote that a public institution of
higher education “helping certain groups . . . perceived as victims of
‘societal discrimination’ does not justify a classification that imposes
disadvantages” on some in the application process “who bear no
responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special
admissions program are thought to have suffered.”88
Heeding Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, when the Supreme
Court blessed the University of Michigan School of Law’s
race-conscious admissions policy in 2003, the Court did so because the
school had “a compelling interest in a diverse student body” that
advanced the school’s “proper institutional mission.”89 Given the
constitutionally permissible interests the state had in promulgating
affirmative action policies under Grutter, Proposal 2 did not target
remedial policies for past discrimination or policies that prohibit
invidious discrimination. Rather Proposal 2, however arguably
imprudent, ultimately shut down one method of achieving diversity in
higher education. Michigan’s public colleges and universities remain
free to ask¾and do ask¾for supplemental information, inviting
applicants to express how they might contribute to the student body’s
diversity.
V. MARRIAGE AND POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING
After state courts in Hawaii and Alaska struck down state statutes
that excluded same-sex couples from marriage rights in 1996 and 1998,
respectively,90 both states’ constitutions were amended to foil litigation
to expand the scope of marriage rights.91 The Hawaii amendment did

87. Id. at 1638.
88. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978).
89. Grutter v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
90. Baehr v. Lewin, P.2d 44, 48 (Haw. 1993), as clarified on reconsideration (May 27, 1993)
abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015); Brause v. Bureau of Vital
Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *1 (Ala. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
91. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (“To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only
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not outright ban same-sex marriage. Rather it removed same-sex
marriage claims from the courts’ purview. Thus, while same-sex
couples’ appeals to the judiciary were dead-ended in Hawaii, they could
continue to advocate for more inclusive family law on an equal basis
with other family law reforms in the legislature.
While it delayed the realization of same-sex couples’ fundamental
rights, the Hawaii Constitution did not impose a unique burden on
same-sex couples in the political branches. No other state followed
Hawaii’s decision to curb the jurisdiction of state courts without
clamping down on the political process. Indeed, every state followed the
Alaska model, which banned same-sex relationship recognition as a
matter of state constitutional law. Despite having ample ammunition,
the legal attacks on state constitutional amendments banning same-sex
marriage did not focus on political restructuring with the exception of
an early lawsuit in Nebraska.
Nebraska was the third state to amend its state constitution to
block the spread of LGB family law equality in 2000. It was the first
state to take action in the wake of the Vermont Supreme Court’s
decision in Baker v. State,92 which resulted in Vermont adopting civil
unions for same-sex couples. Nebraska Initiative 416 asked Nebraskans
to ratify a constitutional provision that outright forbade affording any
state benefits to same-sex couples.93 Seventy percent of voters approved
it.94
In 2003, a coalition of pro-LGB rights organizations filed suit in
federal court against Nebraska Attorney General Jon Bruning,
challenging Initiative 416.95 The political restructuring theory offered by
the organizations gained some traction in 2005 when the groups
prevailed in federal district court.96 That ruling, however, was
overturned by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which
determined that “the political burden erected by a constitutional

between one man and one woman.”); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“The legislature shall have the power
to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.”).
92. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
93. Pam Belluck, Nebraskans to Vote on Most Sweeping Ban on Gay Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
21, 2000).
94. Robynn Tysver, Same-Sex Union Fight Is Not Over, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (May 13, 2005).
95. Complaint, Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005)
(No. 4:03 cv 3155).
96. “Members of all groups, which include those that are controversial, have a fundamental
right to ask for the benefits and protections from the government . . . . Section 29 goes beyond a mere
definition of marriage. Plaintiffs are denied access to the legislative process that is afforded to all
citizens of the State of Nebraska. As previously set forth, the Nebraska Attorney General interprets
Section 29 to mean that any proposed legislation that would give rights to domestic partners would
violate Section 29 . . . . Thus, Section 29 makes it more difficult for this group, a minority, to enact
favorable legislation.” Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1003 (D. Neb.
2005), rev’d sub nom. Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006).
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amendment [like Nebraska’s] would find support” if sexual orientation
were a suspect classification.97 The court rubber-stamped the
constitutional amendment under a traditional rational basis review.
Despite the absence of political restructuring theories in marriage
litigation targeting state-level marriage discrimination, it was arguably
at the heart of the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor
v. United States.98 In Windsor, the Supreme Court invalidated the
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), a 1996 law aimed to thwart the
spread of same-sex marriage. DOMA had altered the Dictionary Act and
defined “marriage” and “spouse” to exclude same-sex couples from the
over 1,000 federal statutes and regulations that conferred benefits on
married couples.99 Among the many federal benefits that DOMA took
out of the reach of same-sex couples were Social Security, housing,
taxation, copyright, and veterans’ affairs benefits.100
The Windsor Court held that DOMA violated the equal protection
guarantees incorporated in the Fifth Amendment because it had the
purpose and effect of imposing inequality on married same-sex
couples.101 The Windsor majority opinion was a hybrid of substantive
due process, equal protection, and federalism, but it stressed the
unusual step Congress took in 1996 to supplant state family law with an
extraordinary federal edict:
The responsibility of the States for the regulation of domestic
relations is an important indicator of the substantial societal impact
the State’s classifications have in the daily lives and customs of its
people. DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates
to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that
come with the federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong
evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of that
class.102

Undoubtedly, Windsor is an amalgam of doctrines in an evolving
line of dignity jurisprudence. The opinion, however, is heavily threaded
with political restructuring undertones carried from Romer and
reinforces the principle that dramatic shifts in standard practice raise
red flags that call for added judicial inspection. As the next Part details,

97. Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2006), abrogated by
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
98. Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
99. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,
and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”).
100. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
101. Id. at 2693.
102. Id.
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whether a law causes a substantial departure from traditional practice,
like DOMA, is instructive for divining whether a facially neutral law was
adopted for improper reasons.
VI. FACIAL NEUTRALITY AND POLITICAL BARRIERS
The problem in challenging municipal civil rights preemption laws
is that they are facially neutral and plaintiffs must proffer evidence that
their nondiscriminatory justifications are merely pretext¾here, that
statewide uniformity is simply good economic policy. Business-related
defenses of these laws ring hollow and are disingenuous. They do not
and should not enjoy immunity from judicial inspection.
Laws that have a disparate impact on minority groups do not
violate the Constitution unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the law
has a discriminatory intent.103 While intent is easily discerned when a
law explicitly targets a minority group like in Romer, a particular
challenge arises when laws are facially neutral but were intended to
have a discriminatory effect. As the Supreme Court articulated in
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation,
courts are empowered to conduct a “sensitive inquiry
into . . . circumstantial and direct evidence of intent” to divine if a
discriminatory motive undergirded legislative action.104
The Arlington Heights Court delineated five lines of inquiry for
courts to examine when inquiring into whether discriminatory interests
impermissibly motivated a particular piece of legislation or regulation:
(1) the historical backdrop of the controversy, (2) the events preceding
the challenged action, (3) significant departures from standard
procedures, (4) substantive departures from typical practice, and (5) the
legislative or administrative history.105 An application of the Arlington
Heights framework to state civil rights preemption laws brings into
focus legislators’ improper, invidious motivations.
The recent wave of municipal preemption laws cropped up in the
wake of a national trend of expanding state statutory protections for
LGBT persons and litigation favoring LGBT litigants. Most importantly,
these state preemption laws were immediate and direct responses to
local governments taking action to expand human rights ordinances to
cover LGBT persons while their state legislators resisted the national
trend. There is no better example of hostility toward sexual minorities
triggering the enactment of restrictive statewide laws than North
Carolina. First, H.B. 2 was an unmistakable response to Charlotte

103. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1978) (explaining that “impact is not irrelevant, but
it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination.”).
104. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Div., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
105. Id. at 267–68.
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extending civil rights protections to LGBT persons. Second, H.B. 2 was
enacted in a rare and hurried special session, a considerable digression
from regular legislative procedure.106 The events leading up to similar
legislation in Tennessee and Arkansas are, unsurprisingly, also similar.
In Tennessee, the bill to nullify local antidiscrimination protecting
sexual minorities was introduced less than a month after Nashville
introduced an ordinance to achieve that very end. The LGBT-inclusive
amendment to Nashville’s human rights law was introduced in January
2011 and adopted in April 2011.107 The municipal preemption bill, H.B.
600, was filed in February 2011 and signed into law in May 2011.108
Dubbed the Equal Access to Intrastate Commerce Act, it limited
localities to protecting classes of persons defined under state human
rights law.109 State law did not expressly protect LGBT persons. And
while Governor Bill Haslam offered support for the law as a
pro-business measure, the bill’s author saw his legislation as social
policy. The sponsor said H.B. 600 was intended to stop Nashville from
“dictating moral policy.”110
To disabuse observers of any notion that legislators were of
illegitimate intent, H.B. 600 also amended Tennessee’s statute
outlawing discrimination on the basis of creed, color, religion, sex, age
or national origin in connection in employment and public
accommodations, and against discrimination on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion, sex or national origin in housing. H.B. 600 took the
added step of defining “sex” under the state’s Human Rights Act as “the
designation of an individual person as male or female as indicated on
the individual’s birth certificate” in an attempt to bar claims that LGBT
discrimination is sex discrimination under theories of sex stereotyping
and gender nonconformity.111
106. See supra INTRODUCTION.
107. Nashville, Tenn., Ordinance BL2011-838 (Apr. 8, 2011).
108. H.B. 600, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011); Bill Information for HB 600, TENN.
GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.captiol.tn.gov/Bills/107/Bill/HB0600.pdf; Amanda Terkel, Tennesee
Anti-Gay Bill, Backed By State Chamber of Commerce, Puts Big Business in a Tough Spot, HUFF
POST (May 23, 2011, updated July 23, 2011).
109. H.B. 600; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102 (2012).
110. Lisa Keen, Activists: Anti-gay Tennessee Law Will Be Challenged, DALLAS VOICE 23 (May
28, 2011) https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth239169/m1/23/.
111. H.B. 600. A number of LGBT discrimination claims have advanced under the theory that
sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination. See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty.
Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2017):
For many years, the courts of appeals of this country understood the prohibition against
sex discrimination [under the federal Civil Rights Act] to exclude discrimination on the
basis of a person’s sexual orientation. The Supreme Court, however, has never spoken to
that question. In this case, we have been asked to take a fresh look at our position in light
of developments at the Supreme Court extending over two decades. We have done so, and
we conclude today that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex
discrimination.
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Arkansas’ story mirrors North Carolina’s and Tennessee’s stories.
Before 2015, a handful of Arkansas municipalities adopted measures to
guarantee equal citizenship in the public square for LGBT persons.112
Arkansas’ municipal preemption law came on the heels of a failed, highprofile, and divisive fight in Fayetteville over a measure favoring LGBT
civil rights. On August 19, 2014, the Fayetteville City Council approved a
civil rights ordinance to proscribe LGBT discrimination in housing,
employment, and public accommodations.113 After a petition
successfully placed the new ordinance up for referendum, voters
narrowly overturned the ordinance on December 9, 2014.114
Responding to the high profile campaign in Fayetteville and
voicing religious opposition to LGBT-inclusive human rights
ordinances,115 state legislators worked to foreclose the issue altogether
with SB202.116 In fact, SB202’s sponsor wasted little time to announce
his intentions, posting his plan to restrict localities from expanding
LGBT rights as vote counting was underway in Fayetteville.117 Despite
naming SB202 the “Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act” to obscure
the municipal preemption statute as a vanilla economic regulation,
legislators repeatedly referred to the failed Fayetteville ordinance
throughout debates.118 Governor Asa Hutchison used debate over
SB202 to voice opposition to LGBT civil rights laws even while he
withheld support for the bill.119
In each of these states, statewide laws that choked off
rights-making at the local level were direct responses to pro-LGBT
campaigns. That these states gave localities freedom to promulgate civil
rights protections before state usurpation of local power constitutes a
substantive departure from usual practice. Applying the Arlington

112. Max Brantley, Fayetteville Adopts Civil Rights Ordinance 53-47, ARK. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2015,
8:00 PM) (listing Little Rock, Maumelle, North Little Rock, Pulaski County, Garland County and
Eureka Springs as banning LGBT discrimination by local ordinance).
113. Fayetteville, Ark., Ordinance 5703 (Aug. 20, 2014) (repealed 2014).
114. Todd Gill, Voters Repeal Civil Rights Ordinance in Fayetteville, FAYETTEVILLE FLYER (Dec.
9, 2014).
115. Updated: Bill Barring Discrimination Ordinances at City, County Level Becomes Law,
ARK. NEWS (Feb. 24, 2015) (“Some supporters [of SB202] also have said they support the right of
businesses to deny certain services to customers based on sexual orientation—such as baking a
wedding cake for a same-sex couple—and that the Fayetteville ordinance would have interfered with
that right.”).
116. S.B. 202, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015); Bill Status History, ARK. GEN. ASSEMB.,
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2015/2015R/Pages/BillInformation.aspx?measureno=sb202
(last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
117. See Brantley, supra note 112 (reporting on a tweet from State Sen. Bart Hester calling for a
state preemption law as election results were tabulated).
118. See John M. A. DiPippa, Bias in Disguise: The Constitutional Problems of Arkansas’s
Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 469, 483 (2015).
119. Michael R. Wickline, Senate Approves Ban on Localities’ Anti-Bias Laws, DEMOCRAT
GAZETTE (Feb. 10, 2015, 1:00 AM).
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Heights factors in tandem with the Hunter and its progeny of political
restructuring cases, courts can readily sweep away the false economic
pretenses offered to justify stamping out home rule to blockade rights
for a disfavored community.
CONCLUSION
In a majority of states, it remains legal to deny people housing,
employment, or services on the basis of their sexual orientation or
gender identity.120 The LGBT community has taken great strides to push
back
against
the
harms
of
discrimination,
successfully
securing municipal antidiscrimination laws in discrete municipal
jurisdictions.121 While an individual’s right to enjoy full, equal
citizenship
should
not
depend
on
their
zip
code,
hard-wrought municipal protections are a crucial step toward achieving
more robust civil rights protections.
Hostile state legislators must not be allowed to stand athwart the
advancement of civil rights and restructure government to harm LGBT
persons. Just as the courts dismantled state and local laws intended to
stifle racial antidiscrimination policies at the local level, courts must
strike down municipal preemption laws aimed to harm the LGBT
community, and reinvigorate the democratic process. Importantly,
judges must not give credence to legislative window dressing crafted in
anticipation of litigation. Courts should rule with clarity that business
“concerns” are insufficient to deny persons the mere opportunity to
meaningfully ask for basic civil rights protections from their local
representatives. Indeed, it makes little sense for the Constitution to
protect same-sex couples’ right to form intimate relationships and
marry,122 transgender persons’ right to be free from discrimination in
the public workplace and schools,123 and yet allow states to deny LGBT
persons a seat at the table in municipal government.
120. Katy Steinmetz, Why so Many States Are Fighting over LGBT Rights in 2016, TIME (Mar.
31, 2016).
121. Local Non-Discrimination Ordinances, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, www.lgbtmap.
org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_ordinances (listing municipal LGBT civil rights
protections).
122. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015):
Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, [the] denial to samesex couples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of
this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them. And the
Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjustified
infringement of the fundamental right to marry.
123. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312,1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (ruling in favor of transgender
woman’s employment discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause); Whitaker By
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1050–51 (7th Cir. 2017)
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause protects transgender public school students from
discrimination).
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